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Executive Summary
Both the action and the communication strategy of the ECB rely on the 
assumption, explicitly stated, that inflation is always a monetary phenomenon, 
and that the interest rate instrument should be devoted exclusively to dealing with 
inflation pressures. According to this prior, the ECB structured its intervention in 
the interbank market around short term liquidity injections, leaving the interest 
rates unchanged. This strategy is different from the one pursued by the Fed, that 
instead used (especially in a first phase) interest rate cuts to reduce the interbank 
rates. Both strategies were efficient in reducing short term interest rates to their 
‘normal’ level. But they proved different in what concerns their effect on longer 
term rates. The rate reduction of the Fed also had effects on long run rates, while 
the spread in the euro zone remained quite high. Thus, from a macroeconomic 
perspective the two strategies are different, the one followed by the ECB being 
more restrictive. We may think that this was not an unintended consequence, as 
the ECB had explicitly asserted its will to tighten its monetary stance. The 
Briefing paper concludes highlighting the risk, for the ECB credibility, of such an 
indirect strategy.
2During the last audition in front of the Committee for Economic and Monetary Affairs 
President Trichet defended the ECB stance in the midst of the subprime crisis, advancing a 
revised and sophisticated version of the neutrality argument.
President Trichet’s argument can be summarized as follows:
 First, in line with monetarist thinking, inflation is an essentially monetary 
phenomenon, at least in the medium-to-long run. As I noted in a previous Briefing 
Paper, this essential and somewhat radical assumption explains the particular 
importance that money aggregates growth takes in the actions and communication of 
the ECB; it also explains the refusal to consider differences between headline and core 
inflation when assessing monetary conditions in the Euro area.
 Second¸ in accordance with the treaties, any other policy objective of the ECB has to
be subordinated to the inflation objective.
 Third, the main instrument to affect the intermediate objective of money growth 
remains the interest rate, in spite of the increasing difficulties posed by the 
development of financial markets. As a consequence, interest rates only have to be 
used to keep inflation near the objective level of around 2%.
 Fourth, other problems, as for example ensuring liquidity needs of the banking sector 
in order to avoid a systemic crisis, need to be addressed without hampering the main 
objective of price stability; thus, on one side interest rates cannot be used for other 
objectives, and on the other any other operation by the ECB should not affect the 
medium run target growth rate of money supply.
Consistently with these arguments, the ECB has followed in the past months a 
straightforward and predictable strategy, both in its actions and in its communication strategy.
The Crisis and the Need for a Lender of Last Resort
The subprime crisis represents a typical case in which solvency and liquidity problems 
are difficult to disentangle. Nevertheless, it is almost a unanimous opinion that in late August 
and in September the crisis was hitting the credit sector without regard to the actual 
solvability of the individual institutions, thus creating an important systemic risk. Thus, in 
spite of the difficulties for central banks to act as Lenders of last resort (LLR) in a context of 
increasing sophistication of the financial system, the praise for the early intervention of the 
Fed and the ECB was unanimous. Nevertheless, this intervention took a very different form 
across the ocean.
3The ECB and the Fed in Action, Fall 2007.
The ECB remained faithful to its credo and to its priorities. The key Euro area interest 
rates stayed unchanged since the latest rise, in June 2007 that brought the marginal lending 
facility rate at 5% and the Main Refinancing Rate (REPO) at 4%. At the time the ECB had 
hinted about further raises in the fall that it did not carry on. On the other hand, the grimmer 
growth outlook, and the significant rate cuts of the Fed, that triggered a troublesome 
appreciation of the Euro, did not induce the ECB to revise downwards its rates, nor to foresee 
possible cuts in the future.
The subprime crisis was primarily dealt with through short term refinancing operations 
that provided the very short term liquidity that the system needed, without nevertheless 
increasing the long term amount of money. If we look at figure 1, where I plotted the allotted 
funds in the weekly auctions for REPO markets (7 or 14 days), and the ratio of the allotted 
value over the bid value (a broad indicator of demand rationing), we can observe that no 
major trend appears between the January-July and the August-January periods. In fact, the 
average allotted funds even slightly decreased in the second half of the year. Thus, overall, 
liquidity injections in the system stayed constant. What changed, on the other hand, are the 
variability of both the allotted funds and the ratio of satisfied bids. These two facts, taken 
together with the lack of intervention on interest rates, prove that the ECB was eager to 
provide the required liquidity to the system, but only on a very short term, to avoid fuelling
inflation.
Fig 1 - ECB Main Refinancing Operations
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4The strategy pursued by the Fed was rather different. At least in an initial phase, the 
US central bank used the interest rate instrument to curb the interbank rates (LIBOR), and to 
inject liquidity into the system. The first reaction of the Fed was a reduction of the Primary 
Discount Rate, in order to narrow the band for short rates (figure 2). Subsequently, the Fed cut 
all rates in five different occasions, keeping the window constant. Overall, Fed Funds target 
rates went down 225 points in 4 months.
Late in the Fall, the Fed also turned more massively to open market operations, most 
notably through the creation in December 2007 of the Term Auction Facility (TAF), where 
banks could borrow using a broader set of assets as collateral, thus transferring part of the risk 
of bad loans to the Fed. The TAF has been successful in providing the short term liquidity that 
the system needed. Facing continuing turbulence on credit markets, on March 7, 2008, the 
Fed announced that it will almost double the amount allotted through the TAF in the auctions 
due to take place in March1.
                                               
1 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080307a.htm
Fig 2 - Federal Reserve Target Rates and Interbank Short Rate.
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5Figure 3 shows the reference interest rates for the ECB and the 1 week Euribor. By 
comparing it with figure 2, it may easily be verified that while very different, both strategies 
succeeded so far in bringing down to acceptable levels the spread between short term rates in 
the interbank market and the target rates. It may actually be said that the ECB was more 
successful in stabilizing short rates, even if this is explained to a large extent by the different 
severity of the crisis in the two zones.
Fig 3 - ECB Target Rates and Interbank Short Rate. 
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6Nevertheless, broadening the perspective we realize that the two strategies yielded 
very different outcomes in the credit markets, with potentially important macroeconomic 
consequences.
The choice of neglecting interest rates and focussing on short term liquidity injections, 
while successful to compensate the short term rate hikes, was not neutral with respect to the 
yield curve. Figure 4 shows the spread between the long term (3 months; higher maturities 
yield very similar graphs) interbank rates and the target rates for the two areas. It can be seen 
that this spread was comparable in June 2007, while today it is much higher in the Euro zone 
than in the US. Access to long term credit is today more expensive in Europe. The strategy 
followed by the Fed, as of today, seems to have been more neutral with respect to the yield 
curve, and to have worked in providing liquidity to the system while not tightening the 
monetary stance.
What the recent events seem to have proven, furthermore, is that it is impossible to cut 
the link between interest rates and liquidity. Using both instruments (and even mainly interest 
rates, as seems to have been the case with the Fed) is less disruptive and more effective. After 
all, the existence of such a link should not come as a surprise. We have known for a long time 
from standard textbook analysis that the link between interest rates and liquidity may be 
broken either because interest rates are abnormally low, or because money is perfectly neutral. 
The first case, known as the “liquidity trap”, is a pathological situation in which monetary 
policy is notoriously ineffective (Japan is the most famous and recent example of such a 
case). For what concerns money neutrality on the other hand, it may be argued convincingly 
that it holds in the long run; but today only the ECB seems ready to behave as if money was 
neutral also in the short run.
Unintended Consequences or Strategic Choice?
We may attempt at a different explanation for the behaviour of the ECB. Maybe, 
instead of being excessively dogmatic, it may have simply acted strategically. The ECB could 
have been aware of the consequences on long term rates of its decision to keep rates 
unchanged; then, it could have willingly let the markets carry on the restriction of the 
monetary stance that it had planned and announced before the summer.
Nevertheless, if this explanation were true, the consequences for the macroeconomic 
environment would not be unintended; but we could have even more serious unintended 
consequences on the credibility of the institution. Markets would rightly feel that the ECB 
uses external shocks to implement its policies without clearly stating the objectives. For an 
institution that has often been accused in its short history to be insufficiently transparent in its 
decision process and in its policy choices, this could become an even harder problem to 
resolve than excessive inflation or a recession.
7We have to admit though that the period is characterised by a growing uncertainty 
about the level of the “natural rate of interest”. It may well be that the crisis did have an effect 
on the latter, may be increasing it, and that we would be in a position to judge what was the 
best strategy only in retrospect. But our imperfect knowledge about the level of the natural 
rate of interest itself should lead us to prefer the strategy aimed at combating the gravest 
danger: depression and debt deflation. 
